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Heuristics in Decision Making
Fatima M. Albar, Antonie J. Jetter
Portland State University, Engineering and Technology Management Dept., Portland, OR - USA
Abstract--Heuristics are simple rules of thumbs for problem
solving that follow a logic that is quite different from
consequential logic. They have long been regarded, as an
inferior technique for decision making that is the source of
irrational decision behavior. Recently, decision making
researchers have demonstrated that some heuristics are highly
efficient and can compete with complex decision models in some
application domains. This paper explores the different streams
of research, summarizes the state of the art decision making
model, and discusses its implications for complex decisions in
engineering and technology management.

I. INTRODUCTION
The essence of management is decision making. Success
in competitive environments often depends on quality
decisions despite huge amounts of information and large
numbers of alternatives. Making a wrong decision can cause
a company to lose its market or to run out of business.
Companies do not only need systems and models to improve
decision making, but they also need to counsel humans to
improve the ways they think, analyze information and make
decisions.
Decision making is centrally concerned with the process
by which alternatives are evaluated and options selected for
implementation [1]. Decision making can be regarded as an
outcome of mental processes leading to the selection of a
course of actions among several alternatives. To make
successful decisions, decision makers have to clearly define
the goals to be achieved, build a mental representation of the
situation or the system to be managed, predict or forecast the
future and make plans for actions under different situations,
while monitoring their own (and the organization’s) strategies
for gathering and processing information [2].
Decision making is not a one-step process, but a
compound process where three components interact with
each other: the decision parameters, the decision making
process and the decision implementation [3]. The process by
which decision makers choose the decision parameters they
will use to evaluate decision alternatives usually involves
cognitive biases constrained by past events and individual
cognitive styles [3]. The decision making process is the stage
where all alternatives are evaluated to produce a final choice.
This process can be based on reasoning or it can be an
emotional process. It can be rational or irrational and can be
based on explicit or tacit assumptions [3]. In the final step,
actions need to be planned and decisions implemented [3].
For a long time, good decision making was considered
equivalent to a rational choice between decision alternatives
that is free of biases and emotions. Heuristics, simple rules of
thumbs, which are based on common sense and used to solve

problems quickly, were considered inferior decision making
techniques that result in irrational behavior. Recently, this
view has changed and psychological research [4], as well as
popular management publications [5, 6], stress the usefulness
of simple heuristics.
Drawing from psychological and managerial research, this
paper reviews different decision theories that can contribute
to our understanding of how to improve decision making
processes. It starts with presenting the ideal of rational
decision theory (section 2) and by contrasting it with
behavioral decision theories (section 3) that are based on the
observation of real-world decisions. Section 4 describes
decision theoretical approaches, such as the theory of
bounded rationality and research on fast and frugal heuristics,
that integrate the normative ideal of rational decision making
and the observed irrational behavior. This section furthermore
discusses recent research on simple decision heuristics in
real-world settings. Section 5 discusses the findings and
section 6 gives an outlook on future research.
II. RATIONAL DECISION THEORY
Rational decision theory was derived from laws that
psychologists believed to be the laws of human reasoning [2]:
Decision makers identify the best decision to take by
computing, with perfect accuracy, how different decision
alternatives will play out. They choose the alternative that
maximizes the value of outcomes to them [7]. This choice is
based on two assumptions about the future: a guess about the
future state of the world which is contingent upon the choice
and a guess about how the decision maker feels about the
future when he experiences it [9]. In many real-world
problems, the exact consequences of the choice are unknown.
Uncertainty may exist because some processes are vague at
the fundamental level, or decision makers are ignorant of the
driving mechanism which makes the outcomes look uncertain
to them, or because of dependency on unexpected future
events [9]. Uncertainty can be modeled through probabilities.
Rational decision theory relies on an extensive use of
logic and mathematical models to represent decision
situations. The strength of these rational approaches to
decision making is in their rigor. Working within the decision
theoretic framework allows one to identify answers and
weigh the alternatives within the framework. These
approaches encompass a substantial amount of educational
content that is straightforward to teach and to test. [8]
Although there are many mathematical decision making
approaches, few of them are actually used. Rather than using
formal methods or following systematic procedures,
managers usually make decisions by reflecting on action or
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having an understanding only of the immediate situation and
‘surface’ appropriate courses of action. Some blame this on
the mathematical complexity or time limitation [10] [11],
others blame the limited applicability of models [8]. Gerald
&Smith [8] found that there are just a few decision situations
that managers routinely face, which can effectively be
addressed by decision analytic techniques. They attribute that
to a lack of sufficient information about problems,
alternatives, contingencies and outcomes. Uncertainty is not
usually localized in a few easily identified contingencies, but
is rather highly diffused [12]. Rational models cannot offer
enough assistance in identifying the problem, predicting,
measuring, quantifying, or generating alternatives and other
elements decision makers need to analyze before making
decisions [8]

assumptions. We thus develop a “sense of what counts as
relevant” to identify the important cues, the goals that need to
be accomplished and our expectations [16]. Recognized
patterns include routines for responding and action scripts.
Even if the situation is not exactly the same as previous
situations we have experienced, we discover significant
direction depending on our developed sense to know what
will work and what will not, by evaluating the actions in our
imagination or “mental simulation” [16]. This process of
pattern matching and mental simulation is known as
Recognition Primed Decision model (RPD) [5]. Figure1
shows this model.


Action
Scripts

III. BEHAVIORAL “IRRATIONAL” DECISION THEORY
Behavioral decision research is concerned about how
people process information and how they make judgments.
Studies in the individual psychology of making choice have
identified different cognitive and emotional limitations that
bind human rationality and produce systematic errors [9]. At
the same time, other research shows that every day decision
behavior is “smart” and people can use intuitive techniques to
make good decisions. When they are asked about the rational
reasons behind their decisions, they use external cues as
reasons for their decisions [9, 12, 13], even if they are not
sure why they made that choice [9, 14].
In order to make a decision, our brains develop cognitive
maps and use them in different ways. The following sections
describe how we develop and use these maps and how they
relate to simple heuristics in decision making.
A. Insight and Cognitive Maps
Our brains develop expectancy or cognitive representation
of “what leads to what” based on knowledge and experience
that we have learnt. These representations are called
cognitive maps [14]. The knowledge we learn may not be
applied and tested until later, when there is an incentive to
perform. Psychologists refer to this phenomenon as the
concept of latent (hidden) learning [14].
By developing cognitive maps, individuals have their own
cognitive styles. Cognitive style is “the way people process
and organize information and arrive at judgments or
conclusions based on their observations” [14]. Kohler [15]
concluded that we, as humans, are able to learn and solve
problems by insight which is defined as “the sudden
perception to a useful relationship that helps to solve a
problem”. Other behaviorists define the insights as a
combination of previous learned responses [4].
We make decisions subconsciously before starting to
perform the analysis [16]. When we face a situation, we
summarize it, recognize patterns of similarity between the
new situation and what we had experienced or learnt, we fill
in missing details based on previous experience and make

Mental
Simulation

Situation

Mental
Modeling

Pattern

Cues

Figure1. Recognition Primed Decision Model [5]

Intuition or “gut feelings” are not based on strategically
analytical thinking; instead, intuition resembles a mental map
or schema generated out of a cognitive conclusion based on
practice, experiences and emotional inputs gained over years
and gave the voice of wisdom [17].
Intuition plays a significant role in managers’ daily work
life especially, when decisions need to be made quickly or
unexpectedly, because potential costs are associated with
delays, or because of a high level of uncertainty, or because
insufficient information pervades the situation. The
importance of studying the cognitive style and the role of
intuition in decision making increased especially with the
increase of rapid and unprecedented change in the business
environment where managers needed contemporary decision
strategies [18]. Khatri and Alvin [19] found that intuitive
synthesis is an important strategy process factor that
managers rely on in their decision making process and it
helps them improve the organization’s performance,
especially in an unstable environment. Jon Anderson [20] ,
who studied problem solving and decision making
approaches of 200 managers from eight different companies,
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found that 32% of the managers primarily use intuition when
making decisions and that the creative and innovative
decision making styles were found more often in mangers
that combined their intuitions with analytical thinking as an
auxiliary. In addition, Burke [17] , found that 40% of
managers, in his test, made decisions such as interviewing,
hiring, training, scheduling, performance appraisal,
harassment complaints, patient care and safety issues based
on their intuitions. Intuition helps managers to make
predictions in situations where formal decision models cannot
be helpful, especially when many changes happen in business
environment, under uncertainty, or in situations that need
flexibility [17].
We need experts because they have developed many
schemas from experience to guide problem solving in their
fields; they are much better than novices at recognizing when
each schema should be applied [14]. Applying the correct
mental blueprint provides a proven route to solve a problem
quickly and effectively. Since general heuristics make contact
with a person’s knowledge base [16], experts depend on their
long-term memory, and they can analyze problems
deductively, selecting the retrieval cues needed by pulling the
appropriate schema from memory and applying them to make
a decision or solve a problem. Since novices do not have
specialized schemas, they use general problem solving
methods that force them to solve a problem in their working
memory which is the weakest in the human mind [14]. World
chess champion Gray Kasparov has developed chess schemas
that enable him to defeat chess playing computers that use
logical rules, some capable of logically analyze up to 100,000
moves per second. Only Deep Blue with a weight of 1.4 tons
could defeat the schemas in the 3-pound brain of Kasparov
[4], [14].
Since we build a cognitive map out of each experience,
we face and use it later when we face similar or close
problems, psychologists tried to identify the common
heuristics we use to solve problems by observing human
behavior.
B. Heuristics in Decision Making
Because we seldom know the exact probability that would
lead to the best outcome, we tend to apply certain heuristics
from judgment of likelihood. Heuristics are “the general
problem solving strategies that we apply for certain classes of
situations” [14]; they are the rule of thumb for calculating
certain kinds of numbers or solving certain problems. They
can also be interpreted as rules following behavior that
pursue a logic quite different than the consequential logic [9].
In the early 1800s up until about 1970, the term heuristics
was used to refer to useful and indispensable cognitive
processes for solving problems that cannot be handled by
logic and probability theory [21]. In the past 25 years, the
definition of heuristics has changed to something that
connotes almost its opposite meaning; instead of being useful
and indispensable cognitive processes for solving problems,
heuristics have come to connote an unreliable method to

make decisions. In research on reasoning, judgment and
decision making, heuristics have come to denote strategies
that prevent one from finding out or discovering correct
answers to problems that are assumed to be in the domain of
probability theory [21].
“Heuristics and Biases”
demonstrated that human judgment has shortcomings and
biased conclusions under certain conditions. The naturalistic
view sees the decision making process as a “situated activity
that cannot be described or prescribed for in general terms”
[8]. The Heuristics and Biases theory concluded that human
inference is systematically biased and error-prone and
suggests that the laws of inference are quick-and-dirty while
the laws of probability are not. They accept the laws of
probability and statistics as normative, but they disagree
about whether or not humans can stand up to these norms [2,
21]. Heuristics and Bias blame this inability of making good
decisions to cognitive limitations. One of these limitations is
a limit of working memory; where our cognitive system can
process, remember, compare and recognize up to seven
variables -plus or minus two- at the same time; if we have
more variance we become ignorant about what is going to
happen [22]. Gay Gould implies that “our minds are not built
to work by rules of probabilities” (quoted by Gigerenzer [4]
page 94). This Heuristics and Bias point of view, represents
the use of heuristics as making decisions that “fly in the face
of logic” [14], and they use the term heuristics to account for
discrepancies between these rational strategies and actual
human thought processes” [23].
The discrepancies between rational decision theory and
observed decision behavior, such as the existence of
cognitive maps and the use of heuristics, are subjects of an
ongoing debate. Increasingly, there is reconciliation and
integration of both streams of research, as the following
section will demonstrate.
IV. COMBINING RATIONAL AND IRRATIONAL
THEORIES
While some models of human behavior (like the rational
choice theory) in the social sciences assumes that humans can
be reasonably approximated or described as "rational"
entities, others, like the Heuristics and Bias theory assume
that humans have cognitive limitations that prohibit them
from being rational and they are emotional and subjective all
the time [6]. Decision makers appear to be good analyzers,
learn from their previous experiences and use their schemas
efficiently. However, decision makers do not consider all the
alternatives, but instead, consider only a few and look at them
consequentially instead of simultaneously [9]. Accordingly,
studies of decision models in real world show that not all
alternatives are known, not all consequences are considered
and not all preferences are evoked at the same time [8]. All of
these factors helped derive the concept of bounded
rationality.
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A. Bounded (Limited) Rationality
Herbert Simon pointed out that most people are only
partly rational, and are mostly emotional or irrational when
they make decisions [24]. His theory is known as the theory
of “Bounded Rationality”. Bounded rationality is experienced
in formulating and solving complex problems and in
processing information including receiving, storing,
retrieving, and transmitting information [8, 25, 26]. Daniel
Kahneman proposes bounded rationality as a model to
overcome some of the limitations of the rational-agent
models in economic literature [26].
The concept of bounded rationality implies that we cannot
feasibly consider the perfect rational decisions in practice to
the finite computational resources available for making them.
Even if decision makers try to make rational decisions, they
will be constrained by limited cognitive capabilities.
Therefore, actions may not be completely rational even with
the best of intentions and efforts [9]. At the same time,
heuristics do not come completely from emotions and against
rationality [19], they come from long retained rational
experiences that have been saved and previously
implemented in our cognitive system [24]. Heuristics are
sophisticated reasoning tools based on schemas (or mental
databases) that experts hone over years of experience and that
help them solve every day problems and make fast and urgent
decisions [24].
More research suggests to not ignore the usefulness of
heuristics [4,5,6,21,27,28,30] and states that heuristics can
help experts solve problems that they face in their domain.
Gorgy Polya, a mathematician who researches mathematical
problem solving, argues that formality of mathematical proof
has little to do with real life problem solving. She describes
how decision makers find problem solutions by using
heuristics or what she calls “general strategies for attacking a
problem that does not guarantee the solutions” [16]. Simon
[24] states that intuition is not a magical sixth sense, but a
sophisticated form of reasoning, which allows us to think
and analyze the situation even if we don’t have previous
experience and we are not “slaves” to our feelings or
intuitions. Klein [5] added that we should treat intuition as a
skill that can be acquired and taught.
Gerd Gigerenzer argues that most decision theorists that
came after Simon and who have discussed bounded
rationality have not really followed Simon's ideas about
bounded rationality. Instead, they have researched either how
decisions are sub-optimal because of limitations of human
rationality, or they have constructed elaborate optimizing
models of how people might cope with their inability to
optimize [2, 4, 21].
As an alternative, Gigerenzer proposed to examine simple
alternatives to a full rationality analysis as a mechanism for
decision-making. He, with his colleagues, has shown that, in
some cases, such simple heuristics frequently lead to better
decisions than the theoretically optimal procedure. These
models are known as “Fast and frugal decision models”.

B. Fast and Frugal decision models
Gigerenzer and colleagues have identified a new class of
cognitive heuristics that can be logically applied. Rather than
starting with a normative process model, they started with
fundamental psychological mechanisms. The “fast and
frugal” techniques that they identified, adaptively match the
informational structure and demands of decision makers’
environments [25]
Fast and frugal heuristics are simple task specific decision
strategies that are ecologically rational because they exploit
structures of information in the environment. They are
founded in evolved psychological capacities such as memory
and the perceptual system. They are fast, frugal and simple
enough to operate effectively when time, information and
computation might be limited, precise enough to be modeled
computationally and powerful enough to model good
reasoning [27].
In the classical decision making process, all attributes
should be analyzed, scored and weighted for all options. This
process can be complex and exhausting for decision makers
when the number of options and attributes increase. Because
most traditional rational models of inference, from linear
multiple regression models to neural networks, try to find
some optimal integration of all information available, they
take into account “every bit of information.” Since decision
makers do not usually have sufficient information and time to
do such processes, the satisfying algorithms, those who
follow the rational theory of probabilistic mental models
(PMM), don’t search for the optimal solutions, but instead
they look for the best solution that would fit with the needs
and satisfy the decision maker [2, 28]. In this technique the
decision maker, or the computer, need to search their
memories for relevant information. They don’t have to
integrate them, but rather a substitution of pieces of
information will be sufficient [2]. One example of such
simple heuristics is the Take the Best Algorithm (TTB).
TTB is based on a rule of thumb that we, as human
beings, apply in our life: “Try to take the best and ignore the
rest.” The simple idea of this algorithm is to treat what we
know as important, ignore what we do not know and start by
testing the most important cues. Once a differentiation is
found between the alternatives, stop looking for other cues
and choose the alternative that satisfies the tested criteria. A
number of psychological experiments suggest that people
follow this rule and often base their intuitive judgment on a
single good reason [28].
Gigerenzer and his research group have analyzed the
quality of results of TTB [4] by asking people to decide
which of two cities has a larger population. Employing the
TTB algorithms, people would first check if they know one
of the two cities. If they do, they pick the one they know. If
they do not know either city or both, they search for
additional cues, such as “city has a major league soccer team”
or “city has a university” until they find one that helps them
discriminate between the two choices. In this case, they
decide and ignore all other potentially relevant cues. TTB is
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thus based on satisfying, rather than optimization: decisionmakers choose the first object that satisfies their objectives
without surveying all possible alternatives. Gigerenzer et al.
tested the algorithm through simulation and compared the
results to other algorithms that integrate all information and
are considered to be rational. For the simulation, they
combined pairs of different cities from a set of 84 German
cities to come up with 3,403 city pairs. In addition to the
recognition cue, they identified nine cues that had different
levels of ecological validity and different discrimination
rates. To model limited knowledge of cue values, they
simulated classes of people with different percentage of
knowledge about cues, which is associated with different
values of recognizing objects. They compared the TTB
algorithm with other decision algorithms, such as weighted
tallying, which weighs and combines all alternatives, and a
regression model. They found that TTB algorithm drew as
many correct inferences as any of the integration models,
including the regression model, and performed substantially
better than linear models. Figure 2 shows the results of the six
tested models.

Figure2. The results of TTB algorithm compared with other decision models,
TTB performed as good as some cumulated models and outperformed others
[2].

Gigerenzer tested TTB again, but instead of predicting the
population of a city, he used it to predict the smallest dropout
rate in a comparison of 57 high schools in Chicago, Illinois,
based on 18 cues [4].
From these two experiments, the simple heuristic of “one
good reason”, or Take the Best algorithm, proved better and
generated faster results than evaluating all reasons in
predicting what we do not know. On average, TTB algorithm
tested three clues before it stopped searching and picked a
choice, which they found to be an acceptable choice. The
complex strategies that use all weights and all clues perform
better than the TTB when there is enough information about
the alternatives and tested criteria but they take a longer time
[2, 4].

Gigerenzer explains the reason behind these results as
follows: “in uncertain, a complex strategy can fail because it
explains too much in hindsight. Only part of information is
valuable for future, and the art of intuition is to focus on that
part and ignore the rest. A simple rule that relies only on the
best clue has a good chance of hitting on that useful piece of
information”[4].
C. Researches on other heuristics:
Building on Gigerenzer et al., many studies have tested
the efficiency of simple heuristics in decision making. These
studies mathematically tested model results and compared
them with compensatory mathematical decision models.
Two different approaches are used to assess the quality of
heuristics; the first group compares the results of using
simple heuristics against commonly used decision models
and against logistic regression. Katsikopoulos and Fasolo
[29], and Smith and Gilhooly [23] use fast and frugal
heuristics to develop multi-attribute models and decision
trees to help caregivers diagnose medical conditions and
prescribe the right medications. The fast and frugal models
have been tested on simulated data, as well as on real cases:
Katsikopoulos and Fasolo’s model registers a performance
accuracy of 72% of the cases, while the logistic regression
system achieved 75% accuracy, but took a longer time [29].
Smith and Gilhooly [23] found that their fast and frugal
decision model based on matching heuristics achieved almost
as good results as the logistic regression model, but was
faster and more flexible in making decisions about the
medication that should be prescribed for depression.
The second group of studies researched the quality of
forecasts that are based on fast and frugal methods. Anderson
and Edman [30] tested the fast and frugal method by
comparing the performance and information process
strategies of experts and non-experts when predicting results
in the 2002 World Cup soccer tournament. From this
experiment that included 250 participants with different
levels of knowledge, they concluded that participants who
had obtained a lot of information about the teams did not
outperform those who had no such information, because just
a slice of information was enough to make good prediction.
In a study on intelligence analysis and early warning
systems, Bradley [31] used only three indicators to forecast
conflict escalation, instead of drawing on dozens of indicators
like the majority of early warning systems. Traditional
approaches necessitate access to substantial amounts of data,
most of which is highly aggregated and/or of poor quality.
Bradley used the results from his “good enough” model to
argue that “both the conflict early warning and intelligence
communities should consider the value of fast and frugal
analysis.”
In business forecasting, Astebro and Elhedhli [32] have
tested the success of simple heuristics in forecasting
commercial success of new products. They tracked the
success of 561 projects which have been evaluated between
1989 and 1994 by experts from Canadian Invention
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Assessment Program (IAP). They found that a simple
decision heuristics (conjunctive decision model) to forecast if
early-stage R&D projects are commercialized succeeds in
predicting 86.0% of the projects correctly; experts predict
82.6% correct, while a log-linear additive statistical model
correctly predicts 78.6%. They tried to link these results to
the number of cues used for the forecast and found that the
experts’ forecasting rules uses 33 out of 37 possible cues,
while the model with the best forecast of project success only
uses 21 cues. In addition, models that use all cues do not
perform as well as those that use a selected set of cues. These
results support other researches which call for using less
attributes [6], because the use of more information than what
they call “optimal” can incorrectly affect the forecasts.
V. DISCUSSION
Even though heuristics can lead to deviations from
optimal decisions, recent psychological and social decision
research is increasingly interested in decision makers’ use of
heuristics. Heuristics are rules of thumbs for problem solving
[9] that do not guarantee optimal solutions [16]. They do,
however, have accuracies close to more complex decision
rules and seem particularly useful in difficult decision making
contexts [32] especially when there is uncertainty over the
future or when we need to make quick decisions [21]. A
class of very simple decision heuristics, the so-called “fast
and frugal” heuristics, is currently at the center of the
academic debate and has found their way into practitioners’
literature. They seem to prove that in an unpredictable
environment¸ complex problems do not always need complex
solutions[4].
Many managerial decisions are highly uncertain and
involve a large number of attributes, but many practitioners
base their decisions on only a few, mainly financial criteria,
such as return on investment [33]. They furthermore do not
always use systematic approaches to information gathering
and decision making, but often rely on readily available
internal information and “gut feeling”. At some decision
points, the gathering of information for a full-blown multicriteria decision model could result in long time delays and
high costs, and, if decision errors are “cheap” because they
will soon be caught at a subsequent checkpoint, it is
acceptable to sacrifice decision quality and choose a simpler,
fast, and less expensive evaluation method. Simple decision
heuristics are therefore potentially useful for some
managerial decisions.

One application area of great practical relevance is the
fuzzy front-end of new product development, which consists
of a series of decisions. Many decisions are highly uncertain
and involve a large number of attributes, but many
practitioners base their decisions on only a few of them [33].
Many practitioners express dissatisfaction with the front-end
process [34, 35], which is presently not fast and not
successful enough. An in-depth study of the potentials of
simple heuristics in the fuzzy front end is required. I will
allow us to answer the following research questions: How do
expert managers in the fuzzy front-end make decisions and
what are the heuristics they use? Are there simple noncompensatory selection heuristics that can be effectively used
in front-end decisions? Can we develop decision aids for the
front-end that are based on simple heuristics and achieve
good decision results?
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